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ABSTRACT
This paper is an analysis of the impact of the repeal of Federal preferences for tenant selection
in the project-based Section 8 program, with particular attention to the Greater Boston area. In
1996, the preferences specifying that households with serious housing problems had priority in
public and assisted housing were repealed by Congress. Since then, most private owners of
publicly assisted housing have been free to change their tenant selection procedures, no longer
giving preference to those with the greatest need.
There are two prerequisites to witnessing any change in the income mix in these projects:
implementation and ability. First, the repeal of the preferences must be implemented by state
agencies and property owners. This analysis presents the interests of the decision-makers and
suggests that most owners will have incentives to repeal the preferences. Second, once
implemented, the projects in question must have the ability to attract higher income
households. There are a number of features of Section 8 projects that would prevent this from
occurring, including the Section 8 rent calculation and the location of most of the projects.
The analysis concludes that even at high levels of implementation and ability, the pace of
change in the income mix will be slow. Increases in incoming higher-income tenants will be
moderated by the natural turnover rate in the projects. Even with the slow pace of overall
change, there will be a substantial number of units which would have been available for
households experiencing severe housing problems that are allocated to higher income
households with less need.
The paper concludes with recommendations that would prevent the loss of units for those with
the highest level of need, while still allowing for economic integration in Section 8 projects.
The primary recommendations are that the implementation should be context-specific, and that
the projects should consider returning to the original intent of the Section 8 program--
providing subsidy funds for only portions of projects. Thus HUD should seriously consider
vouchering out portions of the Section 8 units in each project to create a more appropriate
balance between income targeting and poverty deconcentration.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
When the Section 8 program was enacted in 1974, it was designed to serve households in the
lowest income categories. Previous housing subsidies had succeeded in adding to the
affordable housing stock, but had not been able to serve the households with very low incomes.
Rents in these earlier developments were set at flat levels that were sufficient to cover the debt
service on a subsidized loan. Even so, very low-income tenants could not afford this rent. The
Section 8 program solved this problem by tying rents directly to the income of the tenant.
Tenants would pay 25% of their income toward the rent for an apartment, and the government
would pay the rest. This formula was uniquely suited for serving households of any income
level, from families on public assistance to the working poor to those with moderate incomes.
With this rent structure, the Section 8 program was designed to serve those who needed the
help the most. To this day, it is the only form of housing subsidy in use, other than public
housing, that is able to serve such households.
Since the mid-1980s, private managers of federally assisted housing have been required to give
preference to people who demonstrated serious housing problems, including homelessness,
substandard housing, or a severe rent burden. These so-called "Federal preferences" were
successful in targeting assistance to the "worst case" housing needs among the low-income
population. Recently, these preferences have come under fire for causing high concentrations of
poverty in project-based subsidized housing. To address this tendency, Congress suspended the
use of Federal preferences in 1996. Current legislation, passed by both the House and the
Senate, permanently repeals the preferences. The Senate bill changes the statutory income
targeting provisions of the program, which, in combination with the absence of preferences,
shifts the income level of the recipients higher than was previously allowed.
Considering the large numbers of families with extremely low incomes who are in need of
housing, this repeal of Federal preferences for housing assistance may have a substantial impact
on the ability of very-low income families to find decent housing. The changes being made to
address the need for income mixing have the potential to create another set of housing
problems that will need to be fixed.
In project-based Section 8 developments the property owner has control over the selection of
tenants. Prior to the use of Federal preferences, this process was free of public sector
interference regarding who among the income-qualified should be given priority in the tenant
selection process. Federal preferences were put into place to guide the property owners
decisions based on the public interest: serving those with the most severe housing problems.
Removing Federal preferences from the equation puts the control over tenant selection for a
large number of subsidized units in the hands of private landlords. Unlike the tenant-based
Section 8 program, where the state or the local housing authority is responsible for tenant
selection according to public interests and is accountable to the public, many private owners of
project-based Section 8 developments have little incentive to serve those with the greatest need.
Without publicly determined preferences there can be no assurance that housing units are
available for the families and individuals that are experiencing serious housing problems.
BALANCING POLICY GOALS
In repealing Federal preferences for tenant selection, the Federal government is attempting to
adjust the balance between two goals: encouraging healthy socio-economic environments and
targeting assistance to the neediest. For the past decade and a half, the balance has been off-
center. The much-needed income targeting overpowered the need to create mixed-income
environments.
Households with incomes below 30% of area median income are far more likely to experience
acute housing problems, and the number of such households has been growing in recent
decades. This increase in renters in the lowest income category is substantially due to increases
in poverty among families with children. According to the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), "[t]he number of households with unmet worst case needs would
undoubtedly have increased by more than 1.5 million between 1978 and 1993 if housing
assistance had not been well targeted to those with worst case needs" (HUD 1996, p.2 1).
Current analyses by HUD and others conclude that housing assistance should still be targeted
to those with incomes below 30% of median income. Nelson and Khadduri (1992) analyze
national data to determine which group of households is in greatest need of assistance. Their
conclusion is that the income targeting of Federal programs should be focused more intensely
on the poorest households. Similarly, the Report to Congress on Forst Case Housing Needs is
generally non-spatial in its analysis, and has the same recommendations (HUD 1996, p. 48).
Unfortunately, the project-based housing subsidy system runs the risk of concentrating too
many poor households in a single location if all available units go to those with serious housing
problems. Households living in poverty are far more likely to experience serious housing
problems, and therefore make up a large proportion of those who qualify for Federal
preference status. The recent policy directions, both for public and assisted housing, have been
reactions to the increase in concentrated poverty in America's central cities since the 1970s, and
to the problems with severely distressed public housing developments in particular. As Larry
Vale noted in an article about the public housing system,
the [National Commission on Severely Distressed Public HousingJ comments that public
housing tenant selection, rent calculation, and income e§igibility regulations have screened out
all but the poorest householdsforpublic housing and that publousinusing developments have
become severely distressed at least partly because the resident population has become
increasingly poorer and consists of a high percentage of households whose ony source of income
is public assistance (NCSDPH 1992, in Vale 1993, p. 168).
The subsequent changes to the public housing system have applied to Section 8 and other
assisted housing as well, since major policy changes tend to combine the programs into one
'"public and assisted housing" category. These changes are attempting to increase the economic
mix of households in public and assisted projects. As a result, they threaten to compromise the
income targeting that has been so necessary and continues to be necessary to serve the
households with the greatest need.
RESEARCH Focus
Primary Question: How will the repeal of Federal preferences for tenant selection impact
the income mix in project-based Section 8 developments?
Before any impact can occur, two conditions must be met. First, the policy must be
implemented at various levels, including at the project-level, and second, the projects must be
able to attract and retain a higher income population. A set of secondary questions arises from
these issues: What role does the Federal preference system play in determining the income mix
in Section 8 projects? What other factors have a strong impact on the income mix? What are
the incentives of the parties making the tenant-selection decisions, particularly the owners and
management agents? Who (what groups) will be affected most by the repeal of preferences?
METHODOLOGY
To answer these questions, I examine the current situation in the Boston Metropolitan area to
determine how the policy change is being implemented. I also examine available data on the
locations and characteristics of Section 8 and other Federally assisted housing to set the context
for some of the discussion.
The bulk of the research was exploratory, as is often the case when the policy environment is in
constant flux. Officials at the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, the HUD regional
office, the two primary contract administrators for Section 8 properties, were interviewed to
determine how and when the policy changes have been implemented. Because of the strong
degree of control that property managers have over the implementation of tenant selection
procedures, I interviewed several property managers and owners of Section 8 properties in the
Boston area. These individuals shared their experiences using Federal preferences in the past,
their plans for changing procedures in the future, and some more detailed information on the
income mix in their developments.
In addition to this first hand information, I utilized a number of secondary data sources for
information pertaining to the characteristics of subsidized housing. A new data set from HUD,
the 1997 Picture ofSubsidized Households, was analyzed to the greatest extent possible. This data
set includes the location and tenant characteristics of projects in Federal rental assistance
programs, including pubic housing, Section 8, Section 236, Low Income Tax Credit projects,
and other FHA projects with subsidies1 . Two versions of this data set were used to display
different types of features. The census tract summaries were used to analyze project locations
because this was the most complete coverage available for mapping. Project-level data were
used to analyze tenant characteristics in the Section 8 and other assisted housing programs.
Finally, a simple model of tenant turnover is created to obtain insight into the pace of change
that is likely to occur. This model is explained in more detail in Chapter 4, and the output from
four scenarios is presented in the Appendix.
1 The data on tenant characteristics was not complete for most of these programs, particularly for public housing
and Tax Credit projects.
CHAPTER 2
THE SECTION 8 PROGRAM
This chapter provides the background for the analysis of the process of change and outcomes
of the repeal of Federal preferences. The Section 8 program and its history are described, as are
the requirements for admission to Section 8 projects. The recent legislation is discussed as it
related to changes in these requirements. Finally, the Section 8 context in the Boston area is
presented.
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
The Section 8 program provides rental assistance payments for individuals and families to live
in privately owned housing. Section 8 allows tenants to pay only 30% of their income toward
rent, and the federal government covers the remaining portion. Because of this form of rent
determination, the program is uniquely suited to serving the very poorest households. Tenants
with extremely low incomes cannot become rent burdened, because rents always depend on the
family's income. This was one of the primary features distinguishing this program from its
predecessors, which used interest rate subsidies as the subsidy vehicle. In these earlier
programs, rents were based on costs, so rising costs often spelled financial trouble for the
developments. The Section 8 program was designed to prevent this occurrence from affecting
the affordability of the units for very low-income households.
Section 8 comes in two forms: tenant-based subsidies and project-based subsidies. Tenant-
based subsidies (certificates and vouchers) are provided directly to families, who then find
housing in the private rental market and use the Section 8 subsidy to help pay the rent.2 In the
project-based form of the program, the subsidy is tied to particular projects that were developed
or rehabilitated with the help of HUD or another public agency such as a state housing finance
agency. Only tenants living in the units in the project receive the rental subsidy. If a tenant in
project-based unit decides to move, he/she must find either another subsidized unit, a tenant-
based subsidy, or a unit in the unsubsidized rental or ownership market. In contrast, tenant-
based subsidies move with the tenant to whatever unit he or she chooses.
The project-based Section 8 program, which is the topic of this paper, consists of a number of
sub-programs: New Construction, Substantial Rehabilitation, and Moderate Rehabilitation, and
Loan Management Set-Aside. Each of these programs has a different origin, and thus the
projects have varying characteristics in terms of project location, ownership, and contract
length.
History of the program
When the Section 8 legislation was enacted in 1974, the country was already aware of the
problems created by concentrating large numbers of the very poor into large high-rise projects.
The public housing program, which began in the 1930s, had been criticized for creating ghettos
of subsidized households. Along with this came the social problems associated with poverty
and joblessness. In addition, racial segregation was often exacerbated by the location of public
housing in minority neighborhoods (Hays, 1995; Vale, 1993).
The designers of the Section 8 New Construction program intended to avoid the mistakes of
public housing (and the earlier private subsidy programs) by building in requirements for site
and tenant selection that would encourage mixed-income communities located in non-minority
neighborhoods. In fact, the original Senate version of the legislation would have limited the
number of Section 8 units to 75% of the project for the precise purpose of limiting
concentrations of poverty. Because the House version of the bill did not contain this provision,
it was not included in the final legislation. Even so, when HUD issued the regulations, it gave
priority to projects that contained 20% or less Section 8 units (Jacobs, et. al. 1982, p. 2 5). This
mixed income aspect of the program was meant to facilitate the location of the projects in non-
segregated areas. If the projects could be partially subsidized, it was less likely that
neighborhood opposition would prevent the project from being built.
Despite the intentions of Congress and HUD, the implementation of the program did not carry
out these priorities. The developers who submitted bids thought that this type of unit mix
would not be "workable," and thus most projects were built as entirely Section 8 developments.
Kingsley's 1979 evaluation of the programs also notes that this mixing goal was not met:
Within individual structures, the programs apparently have not met the original integration
goals of their designers. It was intended that Section 8 developers would request housing
assistancefundsfor only aportion of the units in their new project. Thus, low-, middle-, and
high-income households could live in the same apartment structure. It is well documented
now, however, that almost all Section 8 developers have requested subsidy fundsfor 100
percent of the units in their prects. (Kingsley 1979, p. 57).
2 The tenant-based programs have historically been referred to as Section 8 Existing Housing because the
provision of the subsidies was not tied to the construction of the units.
The site standards mentioned above applied only to the New Construction portion of the
program. Sites were limited by guidelines stating that:
0 the project could not contribute to racial segregation
* its location could not have a high travel time to work for low-income workers
* it could not be located in an area of minority concentration or an area in which the
concentration might be "tipped" due to building the project. (Jacobs, et. al. 1982, p. 35)
As a result of these location restrictions, the projects built under the Section 8 New
Construction program tended to be designated for the elderly (Hays 1995, p. 158). Wallace's
1981 study of the Section 8 program showed these characteristics clearly (see Table 1). While
the eligible population was 65% white and 25% elderly, the recipients under the New
Construction program were 85% white and 80% elderly. This striking difference can be
attributed to the greater ease of developing projects for the elderly in the non-minority
neighborhoods that the program was targeted toward (Hays, 1995; Jacobs, 1982).
Neighborhood opposition to projects led developers to take the path of least resistance by
building projects for the "deserving poor" elderly, who are generally not considered "bad" for
the neighborhood.
The Substantial Rehabilitation program was established to encourage renovation of deteriorated
housing in older urban areas. By its very nature, this meant that the projects could not be held
Table 1: Early Section 8 New Construction
Tenant Characteristics
Eligible Population Recipients in
in 1981 1981
Race of Head
White 65% 85%
Black 22 11
Hispanic 10 1
Sex of Head
Male 53% 26%
Female 47 74
Mean Age of Head
Mean age 43.5 65.5
Elderly Heads 25% 80%
One person households 34% 76%
Average Income $5272 $4449
Source: Wallace, 1981.
to the same site standards as the New Construction program. Similarly, the Loan Management
Set-Aside program was established to help rescue existing subsidized projects built under
previous programs. Many of these older projects ran into financial trouble when operating
costs increased, and rents could not keep up (Hays, 1995). An estimated 44% of the earlier
221(d) (3) and Section 236 units have been converted to Section 8 through this program (Abt
Associates in Clay and Wallace 1990, p. 3 18).
INCOME TARGETING AND FEDERAL PREFERENCES
This section describes the forces that contribute to both dejure and defacto income targeting in
the Section 8 program. I will then discuss the specifics of the Federal preference regulations,
and how they interact with the standard income targeting of the Section 8 program. I will
explain the evolution of these preferences, including the recent changes.
Table 2: Rental Assistance by Program and
by Household Income as Percent of Area Median
(Assisted Households in Thousands, Percent of Program by Group)
0-30% 31-50% 51-60% 61-80% 81%+ Total
Tenant-Based Section 8 1065 296 37 22 6 1425
percent of program 75% 21% 3% 2% 0% 100%
Project-Based Section 8 892 345 38 17 7 1300
percent of program 69% 27% 3% 1% 1% 100%
Public Housing 944 241 35 21 9 1250
percent of program 76% 19% 3% 2% 1% 100%
Source: HUD-PD&R. 1996. Rental Assistance at a Crossroads: A Report to Congress on Worst Case Housing Needs. U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research. p.
22
.
Table 3:
Priority Problems by Household Income as Percent of Area Median
0-30% 31-50% 51-60% 61-80% 81%+ Total
Priority Problems 4176 1173 147 147 182 5824
Percent of Priority Problems 72% 20% 3% 3% 3% 100%
Source: HUD-PD&R. 1996. RentalAssistance at a Crossroads: A Report to Congress on Worst Case Housing Needs. U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research. p.
22
.
Table 2 shows the nationwide distribution of housing assistance by the income level of the
recipients. Table 3 shows the distribution of priority problems by income level, showing that
72% of all priority problems are found in households with incomes below 30% of median. The
project-based Section 8 program, with 69% of assistance going to households in this income
category, is the least well targeted to households with priority problems among all the programs,
but the differences are not very large and are generally reflective of the level of need. A large
part of the income targeting of the program is statutory, but there are other features of the
projects and the program that encourage further income targeting. These features often have
the tendency to discourage higher income households from moving to a project or remaining in
a project once income rises.
Statutory In come Eligibility
Standard income ceilings for admission to Section 8 units were set at 80% of area median
income at the program's inception in 1974. This 80% limit is referred to as the "low-income"
limit. In Boston, the median income for a family of four in 1997 was $60,000, so the general
Section 8 eligibility should be $48,000 for this size family. However, because of the high
median income of the Boston area, HUD has adjusted the low-income limit so that it does not
exceed the U.S. median income of $45,300. Table 4 shows the various income limits for a
family of four in the Boston Metropolitan Area.
Legislation enacted in 1981 limits a large majority (75-85%) of available subsidies to "very low-
income" households, defined as those earning less than 50% of area median income (HUD
1996, p.2 3). At the same time, almost 100% of available tenant-based subsidies were required
to go to very low-income households. This difference reflects the recognition that some degree
of income diversity was necessary in a project-based program, whether it is public housing or
Section 8 developments, while tenant-based assistance is not subject to the same constraints.
Table 4: Definitions of Income Categories
Category Percent of Area Income Limit* Maximum Rent
Median Income (30% of income)
Low-Income less than 80% $45,300 $1,133
Very Low-Income less than 50% 30,000 750
Extremely Low-Income less than 30% 18,000 450
Figures shown are for a four person family in the Boston Metropolitan Area
3 Priority problems are defined as paying more than 50% of income for rent, or living in severely substandard
housing, which includes the homeless. The numbers in the table to not include estimates of homelessness because
they are based on counts from the American Housing Survey, which counts only persons in housing units (HUD
1996, p.1).
Federal Preferences
Because of the large number of applicants that typically qualify for the standard income limits,
even when reduced to 50% of median income, there has been a need to specify certain
categories as priorities for admission in addition to this income targeting. Because income is
not the sole determinant of housing problems, a number of priority needs were established. In
1979, Congress created preferences for two categories of people: those involuntarily displaced,
and those living in substandard housing. In 1983, Congress added a preference for families
paying more than 50% of their income in rent. While this legislation dates to the early 1980s,
the regulations were not in place until 19884. These regulations stated that 90% of new public
and assisted housing residents, and 100% of tenant based recipients, had to qualify for one or
more Federal preference (HUD, 1996). In the description of the preference categories in
Figure 1, notice the inclusion of "homeless" under the category for substandard housing. The
inclusion of the homeless in the federal preferences was necessary in the 1980s when this
population began to increase in size.
4 Federal Register, January 15, 1988, pp 112 2 -1 182 .
FIGURE 1:
FEDERAL PREFERENCE CATEGORIES
1. Involuntarily displaced, defined as displaced due to one
of the following:
e local, state, orfederal action
* action by an owner whichforces the tenant to vacate, when the
action is beyond the resident's abiliy to prevent
e domestic iolence (recent or continuing nature)
e victimization by hate crimes
e impairment of mobilty due to lack of accessibiity of unit
(disabled persons)
e sub-family breakup (such as when aparent-child subfamily are
no longer able to lve with the grandparent)
2. Occupying substandard housing, which is defined as:
e dilapidated
* does not have operable indoorplumbing, adequate electriciy,
heat, or kitchen
e homeless, lacking afixed residence, or liting in a temporary
shelter situation
3. Paying in excess of 50% of income for rent.
Source: HUD-PD&R, 1996. Report to Congress on Worst Case Housing Needs.
These preference categories comprise HUD's definition of "worst-case housing needs."
Because of their serious housing problems, there has been a priority to house these people over
households of any qualifying income level, no matter how low. If a household earning $10,000
per year is paying more than 50% of their income in rent, they qualify for a Federal preference
and are housed first, even if another household with a lower income is at the top of the waiting
list.
Recent Congressional Action
A preference "quota" is the percent of new tenants in a project who must qualify for a Federal
preference. This quota has been changed several times since the 1980s. At the time the
preferences were implemented, at least 90 percent of available units had to be given to a
household that qualified for at least one preference.' The Cranston-Gonzales Act of 19906
changed this key quota for admission to both public housing and project-based Section 8
developments. The legislation changed the quota to 70 percent for both programs, thus putting
in place a measure that would help add some income diversity to these developments.7 By
1994, Congress had again loosened the preference system, changing the quota to 50% for
public housing, 70% for project-based assistance, and 90% for tenant-based assistance, leaving
the project-based rule the same as established under the 1990 Act, but changing the other two
programs (HUD, 1996).
These changes apparently did not satisfy Congress' desire to increase the income mix in public
and assisted housing. In 1996, the Federal preferences were suspended in an annual
appropriations act, a provision that has been continued every year until the present.
In essence, the repeal allows property owners to bypass the preferences if they feel it is
necessary, but implementation is voluntary. It is important to note that the project-based
program differs markedly from both public housing and tenant-based assistance in terms of
decision-making. In the latter programs, a local or state public entity is responsible for
determining the circumstances under which the preferences should be repealed. In the project-
based program, the repeal means that private owners are entitled to admit any family who is
income qualified, despite their level of need. In cases where a state housing finance agency
provided funds for development or rehabilitation of a Federally subsidized project, the agency
s Landlords are given discretion as to whether they will rank those with more than one preference over those with
only one. They may also place the preferences in rank order, thus placing one category at a higher preference than
another.
6 The official title of the Cranston Gonzales Act is the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990.
7 At the same time, however, there was no provision for allowing vouchers and certificates to go to anyone other
than a family with a Federal preference. This reflected the difference between the programs, tenant-based
assistance being more amenable to deconcentration efforts.
holds a large amount of control over the owner's actions, as any funder would. This is the case
in Massachusetts, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
Curent Public Housing Reform Legislation
The repeal of the Federal preferences in 1996 was achieved on a temporary basis, subject to
annual continuation. In mid-1997, both houses of Congress passed legislation that would make
the repeal of Federal preferences permanent. The bills differed with respect to the future of
admission preferences. The Senate version (S. 462) would allow property managers to
completely repeal any preferences, however it would require at least 40% of units to go to
households under 30% of AMI. This direct targeting to extremely low-income families has
never been done before, but is weak compared to the current 70% required to be given to
households with Federal preferences, which tend to fall within this extremely low-income
category. The House version would require owners to follow the preferences established by
their local Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), while changing none of the statutory income
limits or quotas of the program. The impact of this version is difficult to predict given the large
number and diversity of PHAs that would have control over these local preferences. The
legislation, as of this writing, is in a conference committee to resolve the differences.
Table 5:
Summary of Income Targeting Provisions
of Recently Passed Legislation
Senate Version House Version
(S. 462) (H.R. 2)
Income 40% under 30% of AMI No changes specified; previous
Targeting 70% under 60% of AMI targeting 75-85% of available
balance can go to those up to units to those under 50% of AMI
80% of AMI
Preferences Tenant selection to be by Owners must follow local PHA
owners with no required preferences
preferences
Starting Point: 75-85% of units to households under 50% of median, 70% of units to
households with a federal preference.
Source: Citizens Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA), "Comparison of Housing and
Senate Housing Authorization Bills," and bill text.
I dr x ,,A -11 ; , -2
Figure 2: HUD Assisted Units as a Percent of 1990 Housing Units in Tract
Percent
0 - 4.99
5 -9.99
10 - 19.99
20 - 39.99
40 -88
Source: 1997 Picture of Subsidized Households Tract Level Summaries
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SECTION 8 PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS IN BOSTON
What is considered a Section 8 project?
Section 8 developments include not only those that were originally developed or rehabilitated
by the Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation programs of the seventies
and eighties. The universe also includes developments from other programs that have been
granted Section 8 project-based subsidies, such as through the Loan Management Set-Aside
program. Because all of these projects are subject to the same Section 8 tenant selection
standards and rent calculation, I will refer to the entire universe of housing with project-based
Section 8 subsidies as Section 8 projects.
Location
Boston and the surrounding cities and towns vary tremendously in the availability of subsidized
housing. This is expected, however, due to the history of exclusion of the poor from wealthy
suburbs. As discussed in the previous section, wealthy areas are often successful at preventing
the construction of low-income subsidized housing through neighborhood opposition and
zoning codes. In this section, I examine the available data to determine exactly what that has
meant for the location of subsidized projects throughout the greater Boston area.
Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution and concentration of Federally assisted housing in the
Boston area. This map was constructed from the 1997 Picture ofSubsidized Households tract-level
summary file. These census tract level summaries do not distinguish between Section 8 and the
other private subsidy programs. Therefore, the data used in Figure 2 refer to all HUD-assisted
units other than public housing and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit properties. The value
shown is the number of assisted units in each tract as a percent of the tract's total housing units
in 1990 (the only year for which housing unit counts are available). The highest concentration
of units can be found in central Boston, where this percentage reaches as high as 87%. Many
tracts within this area are between ten and forty percent subsidized. Other areas with high
concentrations of assisted units are Charlestown, a Boston neighborhood, and the city of
Somerville immediately adjacent to Charlestown. One tract in northwest Cambridge appears to
be highly subsidized. This tract contains an area of high-rise Section 236/Section 8
developments at the terminus of the MBTA red line. The town of Lynn on the North Shore
also shows areas of high concentration.
Tenant Characteristics
Information on tenant characteristics is summarized from the 1997 Picture ofSubsidized
Households project-level database. This file contains information on all public and assisted
projects, collected from property managers' reports on each household. Tenant characteristics
are available only for those projects in which greater than 4 0% of the households had been
reported, and thus represent a (non-random) sample of the total universe of households.
The most important variable to control for in this analysis is the age of the tenants. Because of
the design and implementation of the Section 8 New Construction program, a large proportion
of Section 8 units from the original program are designated for the elderly or disabled. In the
Greater Boston area, which is comprised of the City of Boston and the close-in suburbs', the
Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation program tenants are approximately
66% elderly. For comparison, the Section 236 and "other FHA with subsidy" programs are
41% and 18% respectively.
However, because a proportion of the Section 236 and FHA projects receive Section 8
subsidies, these other projects are affected by the Federal preference and income targeting as
well. For all of these programs combined, approximately 55% of the units in Greater Boston
are occupied by elderly households.'
To examine the tenant characteristics further, it is possible to classify the projects by
elderly/disabled status into family projects and non-family projects. The family units are the
most important to estimate because it is the tenants of these projects and their children who
most likely to benefit from the income mixing that the repeal of the preferences is expected to
produce. Family projects are defined as those with less than 40% of the units occupied by
elderly heads of household. I have also excluded from the family category projects in which
more than 40% of the tenants under age 62 are disabled."
In Greater Boston, approximately 43% of the project-based Section 8 developments from all
programs are classified as family projects. Table 6 shows average tenant characteristics for
these projects in the Greater Boston area. On average, 19 percent of the projects' tenants
receive welfare benefits, 44 percent earn some wages, and 14 percent have incomes over
$20,000. We will see how these characteristics vary by neighborhood in the discussion of
income targeting in the next Chapter.
8 This analysis makes use of the Rental Housing Association's definition of the rental sub-regions in the Boston
area. See appendix for a listing of towns.
9 From this point on, all Section 8 figures refer to the Section 8 New Construction, Substantial Rehab, and the
projects from the remaining programs that receive Section 8 Subsidies. This can be estimated from the project-
level data by the presence of a federal spending dollar amount, which indicates the presence of Section 8 subsidies.
10 Khadduri and Martin (1997) perform a similar analysis with the cutoff at 20% of tenants, but I felt that their
approach resulted in excluding too many projects from the analysis with a substantial number of family units.
Table 6: Tenant Characteristics
Family Projects with Section 8 Project-Based Subsidy, Greater Boston
Number of
Units per % receiving % with wages % below % above
project welfare $5000 $20000
Total
Mean 132 19 44 7 14
N 70 70 70 70 70
StdDev 132 11 13 4 10
Source: Authors tabulations from the 1997 Picture of Subsidized Households.
Summary
The project-based Section 8 program is able to provide housing for the most needy by virtue of
its method rent calculation. Because of the history of the program, Section 8 project-based
developments are often considered to be mostly elderly and disabled households. This is true
for the New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation program, but other projects that
receive Section 8 subsidies are predominantly non-elderly, and all of these projects will be
affected by the repeal of Federal preferences regardless of which program they originally
belonged to.
The current regulations that limit a large majority of units to extremely low-income households
have been slowly revised in recent years, requiring smaller quotas to be given to households
with a Federal preference. Impending legislation will change this by repealing the preferences
or changing the statutory income targeting, or both.
The data presented here indicate that assisted housing is most predominant in Boston and a few
surrounding towns, which have been grouped into the Greater Boston region. Within this
region, slightly less than half of the projects can be classified as family projects, not
predominantly occupied by the elderly or disabled. It is estimated that there are approximately
10,000 units in these family projects in the Greater Boston area, representing approximately half
of the total units in that area.
CHAPTER 3
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE
The amount of change that the repeal of Federal preferences will cause in the income mix of
Section 8 projects will depend primarily on two factors: the projects' ability to attract higher
income households, and the extent of implementation of the repeal by both state administrators
and property managers. This chapter discusses the features of Section 8 projects that might
influence the level of income mix that is possible. It then presents some key considerations for
how the repeal of preferences will be implemented, including uncertainty regarding the
regulations, the ownership status and orientation of the property manager, the incentives for
repealing or not repealing the preferences.
ABILITY TO ATTRACT AND RETAIN HIGHER INCOME TENANTS
In the 1996 Report to Congress on Vorst Case Housing Needs, the U. S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development identifies four factors which lead to deeper income targeting in subsidized
housing than would result from income limits by themselves. The primary influence, at least
since the late 1980s has been the Federal preference system. The remaining factors identified by
HUD are the method of rent calculation, the "modest value" of most subsidized housing, and
the higher demand by very poor households. In this section, I will discuss the latter three of
these factors as they relate to the evidence from this study.
Other Contributions to Income Targeting
Rent Calculation
Because the tenant's portion of the rent is calculated as 30% of adjusted income, at extremely
low incomes, the tenant's portion of the rent can be close to zero". As a client's income rises,
the benefit of receiving a Section 8 subsidy declines, especially when 30% of income is close to
the market rent for similar housing.
At the inception of the program, the rent calculation was set at 25% of income. This
proportion was changed to 30% of income by the 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act. It was
this feature that Nelson and Khadduri credit for having a "greater effect on the income
targeting of housing assistance, because it made alternatives to assisted housing more attractive
for those with other housing options for whom 30 percent of income was a substantial amount
of money" (Nelson and Khadduri 1992, p. 2).
Modest Value: Quality and Location of Subsidized Housing
Except for the Section 8 New Construction program, subsidized housing tends to be located in
areas with few amenities and relatively high poverty rates (HUD, 1996). In central city areas
with high concentrations of very low-income households, these areas also tend to have higher
crime rates, and other deterrents to households with choice. The available data set does not
have information on the quality of Section 8 units themselves, but we are able to show
distributions of the units by tract poverty rate, a proxy for neighborhood distress.
Table 7: Number of Units and
Percent Elderly by Tract Poverty Rate
Projects with Section 8 Project-Based Subsidy
Greater Boston
Estimated Estimated
Tract Poverty Rate Total Units Percent Elderly Family Units
0-9%
Sum 3019 74% 785
Column % 15% 8%
10-19%
Sum 5226 60% 2090
Column % 26% 21%
20-29%
Sum 6034 40% 3620
Column % 30% 36%
30+%
Sum 5851 37% 3686
Column % 29% 36%
Source: Authors tabulations from the 1997 Picture of Subsidized Households.
Table 7 shows the distribution of units and the approximate percent elderly by tract poverty
rate for Section 8 projects12 in Greater Boston. In this area, an estimated 36 percent of non-
11 I say "close to zero" because of the possibilities of using minimum rents, for example $50, for households with
zero income.
12These numbers include Section 8 New Construction, Substantial Rehabilitation, and those projects from Section
236 and Other FHA categories for which federal spending dollars were going to the development. According to
the creator of the database at HUD, federal spending is only present if the project receives Section 8 subsidies.
elderly units are located in tracts with poverty rates greater than 30%, while only 8 percent are
located in tracts with poverty rates of less than 10%. Because tenants in projects in non-poor
areas are more likely to be elderly or disabled, the distribution of non-elderly or disabled tenants
is skewed further in the direction of the high poverty tracts.
It is important to note that despite the large proportion of projects in high poverty areas,
approximately 30% of the family units in the Greater Boston area are located in areas with
poverty rates of less than 20%. Tracts with poverty rates up to 20% can be found in areas such
as Jamaica Plan, some parts of Dorchester, Northeast Brookline, and Cambridge. Khadduri
and Martin classify these tracts as low-poverty: "Although low-poverty areas have poverty rates
somewhat above the national average, they are essentially middle-income areas in which families
usually have access to good schools and public services" (Khadduri and Martin 1997, p.40 .)
Higher Demand by Vey Poor Households
Because of the ability of public housing and the Section 8 program to serve the poorest
households, these are the only housing options in many places for families with little or no
income, or those receiving public assistance. Households in this situation are much more likely
to apply for subsidized housing because of the lack of options. As shown in Table 3 in the
previous chapter, households with incomes under 30% of area median income comprise 72%
of the households with priority housing problems, and thus represent approximately the same
proportion in public and assisted housing.
Threshold Income Levels
Information obtained from Section 8 property managers indicates that attracting households
with incomes near the top of the income limits will be difficult for inner city areas. Many of the
projects studied in these areas have had difficulty retaining higher income tenants in the past.
These tenants, according to the several of the managers interviewed, typically move out when
their income reaches a certain level because they can often get a better value for their money
elsewhere.
There is a certain income level at which the rent paid by the tenant at 30% of income is high
enough that the family could obtain housing for an equivalent rent elsewhere in the private
market. This income level can be called the "threshold income," and it varies according to the
market rent in the area.13
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The general concept of threshold income can be illustrated by calculating the amount at which
3 0% of income is equal to the market rent in the area. Figure 3 shows this calculation
graphically. The diagonal line generating from the origin represents 30% of income, or the
amount of rent paid by the Section 8 tenant. The horizontal lines represent recent market rents
in Boston. Where the market rent and the rent function lines intersect, the tenant would be
indifferent between renting in the private market and renting in an equivalent Section 8 project.
Households with incomes above this threshold would be paying more in rent than they would if
they were renting private housing.
It is clear from the diagram that the threshold income level depends highly on the strength of
the housing market. In a high-rent environment such as Boston, removing Federal preferences
without changing the income limits (set at 50% of area median income) would still capture the
households for whom the value of the subsidy is high enough for the housing to remain a
reasonable option in most neighborhoods. Currently in Boston, the very low-income limit
(50% of AMI) for a family of four is $30,000, so the rent for this family in the Section 8
13 To be technically correct, the threshold rent should refer to a unit where the qua/iy adjusted rent is equal to 30%
of a tenant's income. If the quality of the Section 8 unit is higher than the surrounding market rate housing, the
threshold will actually be higher than the market rent.
program would be approximately $750.14 Meanwhile, the average rent for an apartment in
Greater Boston is over $1000,15 while the market vacancy rate was only 1.6 percent. Most
families with incomes between 30 and 50% of AMI would still benefit by participating in the
Section 8 program given this tight housing market and high rents.
The lower this threshold income level is in an area, the harder it will be for the projects to
attract higher income households. This is because of the implicit value of the subsidy received
by the tenant, which declines as income rises" and as the market value of the unit declines.
This value is the vertical distance between the tenant's rent line and the market rent line. The
closer the tenant's income is to the market rent, the less benefit he or she receives from living in
that unit. As the tenant's income rises, it becomes more and more attractive to shop around
and find a market rent unit for a similar or lower rent.
Areas with higher threshold rents will have a higher level of demand from households at the
high end of the income limits. Demand by higher income households--those near or above the
50% of median low-income limit, is more likely in areas and projects with more amenities, and
therefore higher rents. In these areas the household's subsidy value is maximized. The same
households looking for housing in low rent areas would be receiving little to no subsidy at all by
renting a Section 8 unit.
Summary
The forces contributing to income targeting of Section 8 housing vary by the local housing
market, with projects in desirable areas (those with higher rents, less poverty, etc.) able to attract
and retain relatively higher income households. In Boston, the incomes of households in the
30-50% of median income range are often unable to afford market rate housing in the city, and
thus would benefit from Section 8 assistance. This may not be the case with households at or
above 50% of median, as these households are on the borderline of the threshold rents for the
area, and thus have more choice as to the housing available to them in the private market.
14 $750=(0.3)*(30,000/12) The actual rent is based on adjusted income, with deductions for dependents and
certain expenses. For simplicity I have ignored these details.
15 The data from which this figure was taken are dominated by smaller units, therefore the actual figure for "family
size" units would be higher depending on the neighborhood. Rents and vacancy rates are for the Fall of 1997, as
reported by the Rental Housing Association in the Industry Survy Ti-Annual Report, Fall 1997.
16 In cases where the contract rent of a Section 8 project is equal to the market value, this is also equivalent to the
actual subsidy by the Federal government.
LIKELIHOOD AND CHARACTER OF IMPLEMENTATION
The amount of implementation of the repeal of Federal preferences has a large impact on the
changes we should expect to see. The initial finding of this research was that the repeal had yet
to be implemented in large part, and therefore there were very few changes to measure.
Properties administered by MHFA and those administered by HUD have been subject to
different rules, and are therefore on different implementation timetables. However, both sets
of properties have experienced the effects that uncertainty has on implementation. This section
discusses the current status of implementation, and the likelihood that changes will be
implemented further once the repeal is made permanent.
Uncertainty and Implementation
The current implementation status of the preference suspension is difficult to determine for a
number of reasons. First, some owners are reluctant to discuss any changes they have made in
this regard with someone who is not an "official" researcher or administrator. Second, HUD
Asset Managers keep no records on the number of managers in their portfolio who are no
longer using the preferences. MHFA, in contrast, is requiring that the property managers have
their tenant selection plans reviewed and approved by the agency. It can be assumed that when
this is done, records will be kept as to the numbers and characteristics of those who repealed
the preferences.
One clear finding is that property managers have been weary of making any changes to their
waiting list procedures based on a temporary suspension of the rules. This is partly a technical
issue, due to the fact that many managers use pre-packaged software to manage their lists
according to the previous rules. Reordering the lists could prove to be an extremely time-
consuming task with the risk of causing the manager legal problems if done incorrectly. In
addition, many managers report to both MHFA and HUD for separate properties, and may use
the MHFA tenant selection regulations (the stricter of the two) for continuity of operations.
MHFA has not allowed any changes to occur as of this date, so this may have been a deterrent
to change. For these reasons, managers have not been implementing the suspension of the
rules in large numbers."
Involvement of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
In Massachusetts, the administration of project-based Section 8 contracts is split between The
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency and the HUD regional office. Projects receiving
financing through MHFA are required to report to the agency, while those receiving private
17 This assertion is based on phone conversations with HUD Asset Managers and the managers interviewed for the
study. See Appendix for a list of interviewees.
financing are administered directly through HUD. MHFA has applied an additional set of
tenant selection regulations to its developments that the projects administered by HUD are not
required to follow. Because of this, the implementation of the Federal preferences and the
subsequent changes is quite different for MHFA properties than the story outlined above.
Prior to 1985, MHFA-financed properties were subject to two state-required preferences":
families displaced by public action and those displaced by natural disaster. These laws are part
of the enabling legislation of the agency, which has been in place since 1966. These preferences
pre-dated the use of preferences by the Federal government.
In 1985, the agency incorporated the newly enacted Federal preferences into its official tenant
selection plan, three years before HUD issued the official regulations. The 1985 tenant
selection plan included all preferences that were enacted by Congress, including the displaced or
homeless category, and the substandard housing and rent-burdened categories. Because these
preferences overlapped to an extent with the state-required preferences, they were applied to
100% of new tenants in MHFA-financed properties. This tenant selection plan remained in
effect through the time of this research.
None of the Federal changes enacted in the early 1990s applied to the properties financed by
MHFA. Because of the state-required preferences that were incorporated into the tenant
selection plan, MHFA applied all preferences to 100% of new tenants even when no longer
required to do so. While Congress was relaxing the use of preferences to allow income diversity
within developments, MHFA's implementation held properties to much stricter standards.
Meanwhile, Section 8 properties that were not financed through MHFA have been under the
direct control of the HUD regional office, which has implemented the changes when required
to by Congress.
MHFA has treated the repeal of the Federal preferences just as many property owners have
done. Because the repeal was subject to annual renewal by Congress, there was a high degree of
uncertainty in its implementation. MHFA felt that the difficulty of changing or repealing their
official tenant selection plan would not be worth the impact if Congress failed to renew it in the
following year. However, once it became clear that Congress was going to permanently repeal
the preferences, they took steps toward implementing the changes." These steps will bring
MHFA's regulations closer in line with HUD's regulations. The primary difference between
HUD-administered properties and MHFA-administered properties in the future will be the
18 All information on MHFA's history is based on an interview with Fred Rupp, Management Officer, MHFA.
state-required preferences for displaced families and for victims of domestic violence. Neither
of these categories includes the homeless or those living in shelters, other than for the reasons
stated.
Implementation by Property Managers
Repeal of the Federal preferences is a voluntary change that Section 8 property managers can
implement at will, thus some managers will implement the changes while others will not. It is
therefore necessary to examine the incentives and concerns of property managers as they make
this decision to determine who is likely to stop using Federal preferences. These incentives and
concerns translate into specific impacts of the policy that should be considered. These impacts
will be discussed in the next chapter.
Section 8 properties are owned by a variety of private entities. Some of these are non-profit,
including Community Development Corporations, but the large majority of the units
(nationwide) are owned by for-profit entities (Walker 1993, p. 411). Managers differ by their
organizational orientation as well as their non-profit status, and this in turn will have an impact
on which set of incentives are the predominant influence on the manager's actions. Rachel
Bratt and Langley Keyes (1997) describe three primary orientations of non-profit housing
organizations: place (neighborhood), people (individuals/households) and projects (housing)."
These orientations do not necessarily apply only to non-profits, and they can (and should) be
intertwined with profit incentives. Private, for-profit owners of subsidized housing can be
classified as project-oriented, Community Development Corporations can typically be classified
as place-oriented, and social service-based housing providers can be classified as people-
oriented. While each type of organization may be involved in activities that fall under the other
orientations, such as resident services, there is usually one primary reason for being in the
business of housing. Following are a few of the interests and incentives facing each of these
entities as they decide whether to repeal the use of Federal preferences.
* Profit motivation: interests of ownership Actions that will increase revenues and/or
make the project less costly to run are in the interest of ownership. In a private market unit,
higher income tenants mean higher rents and higher profits. In contrast, in the case of the
Section 8 program, the revenue received on behalf of each tenant is always equal to the
19 MHFA is currently reviewing revised tenant selection plans submitted by property managers, but has not
approved any changes as of the time of this writing.
20 In this document, the terms owner and manager are both used to indicate the entity making the key decisions
about the property. In a large majority of cases, the owner and manager are the same. When they are not,
managers make decisions as an agent of the owner, according to a contract (interview with Fred Rupp, MHFA)
21 Bratt, Rachel G., and Langley C. Keyes. 1997. New Perspectives on Self-Suffideng: Strategies of Nonprofit Housing
Oganizations. Medford, MA: Department of Urban and Environmental Policy, Tufts University, p. 55.
contract rent for the unit size, no matter what the income of the tenant. However, projects
with high proportions of very poor households are often more costly to manage for a
number of reasons. For example, there may be higher utility costs due to the higher utility
usage and higher wear and tear when the tenants are home rather than working. Low-
income tenants are more likely to be late or delinquent on paying rent due to the instability
of income and lack of savings to cushion.
* Convenience: interests ofmanagement Projects with extremely low-income tenants are
more difficult to manage because of the maintenance issues discussed above. In addition,
disruption and disorderliness, and other social problems such as drug use and dealing may
be more prevalent among the lowest income tenants. Problem tenants are not a necessary
result of Federal preferences, but there is likely to be a correlation due to the income level.
The property managers interviewed tended to draw connections between use of the
preferences and problem tenants, possibly due to less control over the tenant selection
process.
e Interests of the local community or neighborhood In the sense that the community is
better off when local social problems are decreased, entities representing the community's
interests are likely to have an interest in the repeal of Federal preferences. To the extent
that the homeless in particular are served by the preferences, this incentive is even stronger,
as the formerly homeless are viewed as having multiple problems.
" Interests of the residents Problem tenants don't have to be present in large numbers to
cause problems for the rest of the tenants in the building. The need to create "healthy
environments" for the children and families in the development would suggest that the
fewer problem tenants, and the higher their incomes, the better.
" Interests of the eligible population, social equity Decent housing is a basic human
need, and to the extent that the families or individuals that qualify for Federal preferences
are those experiencing the worst housing problems, it is in their best interest for the
preferences to remain in place. Unless some other source of housing is to replace these
units, they will have to wait in line for the units along with, and behind, others whose
housing needs are less severe. People-oriented owners, those based in the social services,
are more likely to be oriented toward serving the most in need and therefore most likely to
remain using Federal preferences.
* Reactions to expected actions ofothers Once changes begin to take place, projects still
using Federal preferences are likely to receive an influx of preference applicants. Owners
fearing this influx may feel that the only way to prevent it is to "follow the crowd" by
repealing the preferences as well. Even those who did not object to the preferences under
the previous level of demand might object when the numbers become overwhelming.
The for-profit managers interviewed for this paper agreed that they would prefer not to use the
Federal preferences. When asked why a greater income mix would be preferable, a number of
reasons were cited. First, they mentioned difficulties dealing with "problem tenants." Second,
they mentioned experiencing problems with the families with extremely low incomes, a group
that doesn't always correspond to "problem" tenants. And third, there was a tendency to
mention the improved quality of life that residents would have if they lived in a more balanced
(by income) community.
The exception to this finding was the manager of a large development in the Grove Hall area of
Dorchester. This property is owned by a CDC, but the manager is employed by a private
company. The central office of his management company (Winn Management) made a
decision not to revise their tenant selection plan when given the option to repeal Federal
preferences. The on-site property manager felt that he had the ability and the responsibility to
"take care" of the families with extremely low incomes and those with "problems." He felt that
his property management capabilities, including the services put in place by the owner, Codman
Square NDC, prepared him to handle these families". He did not feel that many managers
were willing or able to take on that role. This attitude, he explained, is partly due to his
upbringing in "the projects" of New York City. It can also be attributed to the "agent" role
that he takes in managing a property for a non-profit, community-based organization.
Whatever the source, he did not feel that there was a need to introduce higher income families
(over 50% MFI) into the development. He would only do so, he stated, if he were required to
by law (through HUD or MHFA) or if the development were "vouchered out."23
In the current environment, given the incentive structure outlined above, the incentives of the
decision-makers for project-based Section 8s are aligned with the repeal of Federal Preferences.
Even non-profit owned properties, especially if the organization is neighborhood based, would
have incentives to discontinue using the preferences if the result would contribute to
neighborhood stabilization. In addition, non-profits are not immune to the difficulties of
managing very low-income projects. These owners, however, represent only a small portion of
owners of housing in these older assisted programs.
2 Codman Square NDC has hired on-site community organizing and resident-resource staff to work with
community residents. This work ranges from running workshops for tenants to providing child care and
employment training.
23 "Vouchering out" refers to replacing the project-based subsidies with tenant-based subsidies, an approach that is
an option in the Mark-to-Market debt restructuring program through HUD. If this were to happen, the units
would rent at market rates, and those families who wished to use their subsidies in the development would be
allowed, otherwise they could use the subsidy like a standard tenant-based mobile subsidy and move to another
project in the private market (see Chapter 2).
Summary
This chapter suggests that the ability to attract and retain higher income tenants in Section 8
housing is limited by the Section 8 rent calculation and the location of a substantial proportion
of the projects with Section 8 subsidies. Because of the interaction between the rent calculation
and the market value of units in the surrounding areas, there is reason to believe that most
Section 8 projects will have limited ability to attract households with incomes over 50% of area
median income. These households are less likely to experience serious housing problems, such
as lack of affordability, and are more likely to find units on the market at rents they can afford.
In Boston, with its high rents and tight housing market, there is reason to believe that
households with incomes up to 50% of median will still find housing in Section 8 projects a
viable option, given the limited alternatives in the private market. This finding varies by area,
with locations that have higher "threshold incomes" being more attractive to households with
incomes over 50% of median.
Implementation of the temporary repeal of Federal preferences in 1996 has been slow for two
primary reasons. First, MHFA did not allow the owners of properties administered by the
agency to revise their tenant selection plans to reflect the changes. Nor had they allowed these
owners to make the changes specified in the early 1990s that would have decreased the
proportion of new tenants qualifying under the Federal preferences from 90% to 70%. Second,
all property owners/managers were reluctant to make changes that were based on a temporary
repeal of the law. These changes would be difficult to undo, so they wanted to be sure that the
repeal would be permanent before making any changes to their automated waiting lists.
With the repeal most likely to be made permanent by upcoming Federal legislation, it is
probable that property owners will have a incentives to repeal the preferences themselves,
whether those incentives are based on the best interests of their current residents and the
neighborhood, or on profit motivations or other self-interest. This will not be the case for all
property owners, however. But for those who are well-meaning enough to keep the
preferences on the books, an increase in demand by "preference" households may convince
them to repeal the preferences anyway. In the words of Ann Anderson at MHFA, "not even
the most socially conscious owner wants to be the only game in town."
CHAPTER 4
PROJECTED IMPACTS
In this chapter, I will discuss the impact that the repeal of Federal preferences is likely to have
on the income mix in project-based Section 8 developments. I first present estimations of the
magnitude of overall impact in the Greater Boston area based on a simple model of turnover.
A number of scenarios are presented to show the variations in impact given what we have
learned from the preceding chapters. Next, I identify a number of factors along which changes
are likely to vary. Recognition of these variations should aid implementing agencies in
controlling or encouraging these changes where appropriate. Finally, I present additional
findings from the interviews with property managers, including the impacted population and
the interaction with welfare reform.
MAGNITUDE OF IMPACT
The extent to which there will be any discernible impact of the repeal of Federal preferences
depends on factors from the preceding chapters. Will the properties be able to attract higher
income families? Will managers actually implement the changes?
To make these projections, I have created a model of tenant turnover based on the research
findings and other published HUD data. The model predicts the annual net increase in tenants
with incomes over 30% of AMI, taking account of turnover among these tenants, the likelihood
of implementation, and the ability of projects to attract higher income tenants. The Federal
preferences had the effect of targeting most of the assistance in Section 8 units, approximately
70%, to households at this income level. Repeal of the preferences changes only the statutory
targeting of the program, not any of the other factors that affect the actual income level of the
recipients, such as the rent calculation, location, the quality of the units, and the high demand
by extremely low-income households (see Chapter 3). The scenarios constructed in the model
take into account the ability (or lack thereof) of the projects to attract incomes at higher levels.
The model takes as its starting point the assumption that 31% of the tenants in project-based
Section 8 units currently have incomes over 30% of Area Median Income. Because this level of
detail was not available for the Boston area, this number is taken from the national figures
published by HUD in the 1996 Report to Congress on Forst Case Housing Needs, as shown in Table
2 in Chapter 2. Annual turnover is assumed to be approximately 5%, based on interviews with
property managers for this study. The model makes a simplifying assumption that the turnover
among households over 30% of AMI is equivalent to their representation in the tenant
Table 8:
Scenario Variable Descriptions
high low
Ability
Percent from higher income category 60% 40%
Implementation
Percent of units implementing "new 40-75% 25-50%
targeting"
population. In other words, there is no variation in turnover by the income of the tenants--a
moderate income tenant is just a likely to move as a low income tenant. The implications of
this assumption will be discussed below. And finally, the total number of units under
consideration in this model is 10,000--the approximate number of units in family projects in
Greater Boston (see Chapter 2).
This analysis will use several scenarios to project the magnitude of the impact that can be
expected once the repeal of preferences is made permanent. The scenarios have two variables:
the ability to attract higher income households, and the level of implementation.
In the high-ability scenario, the proportion of new tenants with incomes above 30% of AMI is
60%. This value is based on the minimum set-aside of 40% of units for extremely low-income
families in the Senate version of the Public Housing Reform Legislation. Under this legislation,
60% is the absolute maximum amount of new tenants above 30% of AMI allowed. The low-
ability scenario takes the current assumed value of 30% of new tenants in the 30-plus range and
increases it by 10 percent. Implementation scenarios include two values of the proportion of
properties (and therefore units) that have switched to the new targeting scheme: the initial (first
year) implementation value and the long-term (five years) implementation value. In the low-
implementation scenario, 25% of the units are subject to "new targeting" immediately, and 50%
in the long term. The high-implementation scenario assumes that 40% are subject to "new
targeting" immediately and 75% in the long term. Table 9 shows a summary of results from
each of the four scenarios.
In the high implementation/high ability projections, approximately 55 to 93 units in Greater
Boston that would normally have gone to households under 30% of AMI will go to households
over 30% AMI. In the low implementation/low ability scenario, these numbers are
substantially lower, ranging from 8 to 18 units. An interesting finding of these scenarios is the
relatively slow change of the overall income mix in the projects. From a starting point of 31%
Table 9:
Scenario Summary
Projected extremely low-income units lost and resulting income mix
Annual number of units Percent of total tenant
lost for families population with incomes over
Implemen- below 30% of AMI 30% of AMI
Scenario Ability* tation* low (initial) high (5 years) 5 years 10 years
1 high high 55 93 34.7% 38.8%
2 high low 33 61 33.4% 36.0%
3 low high 15 28 32.1% 33.3%
4 low low 8 18 31.6% 32.4%
Source: Author's calculations. See text and appendix for more details on the model.
of tenants with incomes over 30% AMI, even the high/high scenario (#1) results in only a
3.7% cumulative change in this proportion after five years, to 34.7%.
The model assumes that turnover for higher income households is equal to lower income
households. If, in fact, higher income households are more likely to move out than lower
income households, the numbers projected may tend to overstate the amount of change that
occurs. This is because the larger numbers of higher income households moving in will be
replacing other higher income households rather than lower income households. So it would
take an even greater increase in new higher income tenants to make up for the larger amount
moving out.
Another assumption in the model is that the ability to attract higher income tenants is constant
over time. In fact, this "ability" is likely to increase as the proportion of higher income tenants
increases. This is due to the comfort level of higher income households increasing as the
contrast between themselves and the existing tenants decreases. They may be more likely to
want to live in the project if it is not predominantly poor. This is especially true in larger
projects rather than smaller scattered site developments, where tenants are more conscious of
the other tenants in the building due to higher levels of contact.
VARIATIONS IN IMPACT
The simulation model above presents only an aggregate figure of change among the entire stock
of Section 8 units in the Greater Boston Area, which is not likely to be equally distributed
across all projects and locations. The most obvious variations from project to project are the
project's physical features and its location. Other factors that contribute to income targeting are
functions of the program itself and should not vary from project to project.
Location
The location of the project primarily affects the value of the subsidy that Section 8 households
receive. It is commonly understood that housing value is a function of location to a large
extent. In certain depressed markets, the market rent of comparable housing is low enough to
be considered competition for Section 8 units--but only for households with incomes high
enough to pay the market rent.
The threshold income levels explained in Chapter 3 imply that there is a risk of creating a
spatially stratified system of admission to Section 8 projects: higher demand by families at the
high end of the income limits for projects in non-poor neighborhoods (or those with high
income thresholds). Project-based subsidized housing in non-poor neighborhoods is already
relatively scarce, considering the proportion of these units that are designated for the elderly."
This dynamic is no different after the preferences were repealed than before. The difference is
that the manager is no longer obligated to give preference to households with priority needs,
whose incomes tend to be below 30% of median family income. Therefore, properties in areas
with higher income thresholds will have a greater variety of income levels applying for the units,
resulting in higher income tenants than before. This will not necessarily be the case for projects
in distressed areas.
Project Size
Larger projects that are currently occupied primarily by poor households may also have a
difficult time attracting higher income households. Managers felt that these households would
be hesitant to live in what would feel like a "project" if the current residents are primarily poor.
These managers felt that it would be easier to create an income mix in scattered site projects-
or buildings with a smaller, more street-oriented feeling.
IMPACT ON THE HOMELESS
It was clear in the interviews with property managers that one of their key concerns with using
the Federal preferences was the inclusion of the homeless in the substandard housing category.
One manager who had begun revising his tenant selection plan had kept only one preference
that was not included in the list of those required by MHFA-the preference for those living in
substandard housing. The revised plan re-defined this category removing any mention of the
homeless or those living in shelters. Other managers held similar discontent for housing the
formerly homeless, often mentioning the needs that this population has for social services,
counseling, and drug abuse, among other issues.
The MHFA recognizes this concern among private property managers, and admits that they are
not unfounded concerns. 2 ' Even more concerning is the expectation that owners who have
been adept at housing the homeless under previous levels of demand might also remove this
preference for fear that they would see an influx of homeless on their waiting lists. In Ann
Anderson's words, "not even a very socially conscious owner wants to be the only game in
town." This influx would occur due to displaced demand from the projects that had previously
removed this preference. In addition, many of these projects have seen recent cuts in funding
for social services as it stands. Increasing the level of need in any particular project would not
be supportable without additional funding for services.
INTERACTION WITH WELFARE REFORM
Once the current Public Housing Reform legislation is signed into law, which could occur this
year, a flood of tenant selection plan changes can be expected. Much of the inaction on the
part of landlords since the initial policy change in 1996 can be attributed to the uncertainty in
the regulations. The repeal of the preferences was subject to annual renewal, and landlords
feared that any changes made would have to be removed once again. When the repeal becomes
permanent, much of the hesitation will disappear.
This rush to remove federal preferences is likely to occur in tandem with the implementation of
welfare reform, specifically the enaction of the two year time limit on December 1V, 1998.
These time limits will be placing a large number of families at risk of homelessness at the same
time that subsidized units for them are being reduced. While the pace of the impact has been
and will continue to be slow, the fact is that one buffer against homelessness is being removed
at the same time that welfare households with serious problems, housing-related and otherwise,
will need that support.
24 It is possible that project-based Section 8s are also more able to serve families in higher rent areas than tenant-
based vouchers and certificates are. The latter are subject to the willingness of private, unsubsidized landlords to
participate, and to the availability of units at appropriate rents.
25 Phone conversation with Ann Anderson, MHFA.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
The findings of this research indicate that the slow pace of implementation of the repeal of
Federal preferences is likely to pick up pace once the uncertainties inherent in the temporary
repeal are removed. Private owners of subsidized housing will be able to return to the use of
time-ordered waiting lists. Thus, depending on how widely implemented the permanent repeal
is likely to be, a key source of housing for households below 30% of area median income,
particularly the homeless, will be reduced. If the incentives are aligned as outlined in this paper,
the repeal will be fairly widespread across all types of property owners and managers.
At higher levels of implementation, there is likely to be some disruption in the ability of
extremely low-income families, who would normally qualify for Federal preference, to find a
project-based Section 8 unit; There will be a net reduction in the number of these households
served. Even if the number of households 'deflected' is less than one hundred per year in the
Greater Boston area, as these projections indicate, this is still a substantial number considering
the extremely limited options of households in this income category. In the short term (five
years), these losses will result in a best-case scenario increase of less than four percentage points
in the proportion of tenants with incomes greater than 30% of area median income. Policy
makers should weigh these relatively small gains in income mixing against the losses in units for
households with the greatest need.
Shifts in the income level of the tenants are most likely to be toward the 30-50% of median
income range. This analysis shows that households with incomes near or above 50% of median
have a higher likelihood of finding housing in the private market. These households are far less
likely to experience priority housing problems such as extremely high rent burdens, and are less
likely to apply for housing in Section 8 developments.
These impacts are likely to be the strongest in the most desirable neighborhoods, and not as
strong as desired in less desirable areas. In distressed areas, relaxing preferences may not be
enough to attract or retain a higher-income population in Section 8 projects. In these areas, the
threshold income is reached at a lower percent of median income. These differences imply that
the best units will be 'lost' to households experiencing less need, while those with less choice
will be relegated to the projects that are unwanted by these higher income families. Income-
mixing will be more likely to occur in projects that already had an income mix--those that were
able to sustain a mix under the previous regulations.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Context-specific implementation
The findings imply that the implementation of the policy should at least take the neighborhood
and project context into account. Not all Section 8 projects need to enhance their ability to
attract higher income households--some do so naturally thanks to better locations or amenities.
A system-wide repeal of the preferences overlooks the role that the preferences have played in
targeting assistance to worst-case households, which are served by some projects without
difficulty. Those that have an over-concentration of extremely low-income or problem families
should be able to apply for waivers from the use of preferences, both from MHFA and HUD.
Those not qualifying should still be subject to the preferences.
Keep control over major decisions with a public entity, not the private owners
Placing the decisions of tenant selection for such a large proportion of assisted housing in the
hands of private owners assumes property owners are capable of making decisions that are in
the best interests of society. Unfortunately, many owners do not have the public interest in
mind when making tenant selection decisions. The House version of the impending legislation
would require property owners to use the preferences specified by their local PHAs. This
accomplishes the public decision-making aspect of the recommendation, but still violates the
previous recommendation that implementation be context specific. The public entities that
currently administer the Section 8 contracts, MHFA and HUD in Massachusetts, should have
the ultimate say in whether a project will be required to use preferences. Specific reasons
should be specified as cases where the owner may repeal the preferences, for example, when
the use of preferences results in no new tenants with incomes over 30% of median income, or
when less than 20% of the tenants in the entire project have incomes over 30% of median.
Return to partially subsidized projects
In light of these findings, there are some more appropriate ways of creating an income mix
other than by using Section 8 to attract higher income households--for whom the benefit of a
Section 8 subsidy is small. The program design originally planned for the Section 8 units to be
only a small proportion of the units in the project. If the goal is to attract households with
incomes between 50% and 80% of median income, a more efficient approach would be to
transform the project into a partially subsidized project, releasing a certain number of the units
as tenant-based subsidies. As these tenants move out, they can be replaced with unsubsidized
flat or market rent units, where rent is not based on income and is therefore more attractive to
higher income households. These units would be rented using a minimum income standard--
enough to afford the rent at no more than 30% of income, but under the low-income cutoff of
80% of AMI.
In this approach, there are no units lost overall for extremely low income households because
of the use of vouchers, and a critical number of project-based units remain tied to the structure.
This is superior to changing the overall income limits or completely repealing Federal
preferences, in which case the total number of extremely low-income households served
declines. This scenario does not involve a trade-off in the sense of loosening income targeting
in order to achieve economic diversity, it allows both to be achieved simultaneously.
This vouchering out may not be possible in projects in extremely distressed areas, or those that
cannot sustain a market rent because of the quality of the unit or the environment. In these
cases, working within the Section 8 program by allowing the repeal of preferences or the
admission of a larger percentage of households above 30% of AMI would result in encouraging
a mix of very poor households with the working poor.
In the end, each project's situation should be considered separately, depending on the
neighborhood environment among other factors. A complete repeal of preferences and
possibly a change in the overall income targeting of the program is not necessary for the entire
portfolio of Section 8 projects. The legislation as it currently stands would allow all property
owners to overlook those who need assistance the most, no matter whether the change is
warranted by a current concentration of poverty within or around the project. When this is the
case, trading income targeting for income mixing may turn out to be the error that this
generation of policies will leave as a legacy, just as the previous decades did the opposite.
APPENDIX A
LIST OF INTERVIEWS
ED ABRAMS
Owner, Abrams Management
ANN ANDERSON
Community Services, Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
MILES BYRNE
Property Manager, CMJ Management (Harbor Point)
HECTOR CRUZ
Property Manager, Winn Management (Washington-Columbia I)
MINNETTE DESMOND
Property Manager, Abrams Management
BILL DONLAN
Asset Manager, HUD Regional Office
BRIAN KEANE
Regional Manager, Winn Management
GAIL LATIMORE
Deputy Director, Codman Square NDC
WARREN MROZ
Asset manager, HUD Regional Office
FREDD RuPP
Management Officer, Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
JOHN STRODDER
General Manager, Long Bay Management Company
STEPHANIE WATTS
Property Manager, Cruz Management Company
HEIDI YACKNICK
Property Manager, S-C Management (Fresh Pond Apartments)
APPENDIX B
LIST OF TOWNS IN GREATER BOSTON AREA
The Rental Housing Association specifies these towns as being Greater Boston in its Tri-
Annual Report:
Arlington
Belmont
Boston
Brookline
Cambridge
Chelsea
Chestnut Hill
Everett
Malden
Medford
Melrose
Revere
Somerville
Watertown
West Somerville
Winchester
APPENDIX C
MODEL OF TURNOVER IN SECTION 8 PROJECTS
Pace of Change: High Ability, High Implementation Scenario
Projected Increase in Households with Incomes Above 30% in the Project-Based Section 8 Program
Assumptions:
starting
total number percent above
of units 30% AMI annual turnover
10000 31%
old targeting new targeting
percent of
new tenants
over 30%
30%
changed percent initial
new over 30% implementation
60% 40%
turnover
Total Tenants percent of units new tenants tenants over
Number of above 30% to which rules over 30% 30% AMI
Year Units AMI will apply AMI moving out*
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
3100
3155
3220
3296
3380
3474
3563
3647
3727
3803
3876
3944
4010
4072
4130
40%
49%
58%
66%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
210
223
236
249
263
263
263
263
263
263
263
263
263
263
263
net new tenants
over 30%
AMI**
155
158
161
165
169
174
178
182
186
190
194
197
200
204
207
total tenants
over 30%
AMI
3155
3220
3296
3380
3474
3563
3647
3727
3803
3876
3944
4010
4072
4130
4186
net annual cumul-ative
increase increase
1.77%
2.07%
2.34%
2.57%
2.77%
2.56%
2.37%
2.20%
2.04%
1.90%
1.77%
1.66%
1.55%
1.45%
1.36%
1.77%
3.88%
6.31%
9.04%
12.05%
14.92%
17.64%
20.23%
22.68%
25.02%
27.23%
29.34%
31.34%
33.24%
35.05%
total percent
over 30%
AMI
31.6%
32.2%
33.0%
33.8%
34.7%
35.6%
36.5%
37.3%
38.0%
38.8%
39.4%
40.1%
40.7%
41.3%
41.9%
cumulative change
in percent over
30% AMI
0.55%
1.20%
1.96%
2.80%
3.74%
4.63%
5.47%
6.27%
7.03%
7.76%
8.44%
9.10%
9.72%
10.30%
10.86%
* Percent of tenants over 30% of AMI moving out is assumed proportional to the current tenant profile (number of tenants above 30% AMI * turnover)
** Net new tenants over 30% AMI is roughly equivalent to the number of units lost for families below 30% AMI
long term
implemen-
tation
75%
end of year
AMI
Pace of Change: High Ability, Low Implementation Scenario
Projected Increase in Households with Incomes Above 30% in the Project-Based Section 8 Program
Assumptions:
starting
total number percent above
of units 30% AMI
10000 31%
annual turnover
5%
old targeting new targeting
percent of
new tenants
over 30%
30%
changed percent
new over 30%
60%
turnover
Total Tenants percent of units
Number of above 30% to which rules
Year Units AMI will apply
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
3100
3133
3173
3220
3275
3336
3432
3523
3609
3691
3769
3843
3914
3980
4044
25%
31%
38%
44%
50%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
new tenants tenants over
over 30% 30% AMI
AMI moving ou~t*
188
197
206
216
225
263
263
263
263
263
263
263
263
263
263
155
157
159
161
164
167
172
176
180
185
188
192
196
199
202
net new tenants
over 30%
AMI**
total tenants
over 30%
AMI
3133
3173
3220
3275
3336
3432
3523
3609
3691
3769
3843
3914
3980
4044
4104
total percent
net annual cumul-ative over 30%
increase increase AMI
1.05%
1.28%
1.50%
1.70%
1.87%
2.87%
2.65%
2.45%
2.27%
2.11%
1.96%
1.83%
1.71%
1.59%
1.49%
1.05%
2.35%
3.88%
5.64%
7.62%
10.71%
13.64%
16.42%
19.07%
21.59%
23.97%
26.24%
28.40%
30.45%
32.39%
31.3%
31.7%
32.2%
32.7%
33.4%
34.3%
35.2%
36.1%
36.9%
37.7%
38.4%
39.1%
39.8%
40.4%
41.0%
cumulative change
in percent over
30% AMI
0.32%
0.73%
1.20%
1.75%
2.36%
3.32%
4.23%
5.09%
5.91%
6.69%
7.43%
8.14%
8.80%
9.44%
10.04%
* Percent of tenants over 30% of AMI moving out is assumed proportional to the current tenant profile (number of tenants above 30% AMI * turnover)
** Net new tenants over 30% AMI is roughly equivalent to the number of units lost for families below 30% AMI
initial
implementation
25%
long term
implemen-
tation
50%
end of year
AMI movine, out* AMl** AMI
Pace of Change: Low Ability, High Implementation Scenario
Projected Increase in Households with Incomes Above 30% in the Project-Based Section 8 Program
Assumptions:
starting
total number percent above
of units 30% AMI annual turnover
10000 31%
old targeting new targeting
percent of
new tenants
over 30%
30%
changed percent
new over 30%
40%
turnover
Total
Number of
Tenants
above 30%
percent of units
to which rules
new tenants
over 30%
tenants over
30% AMI
net new tenants
over 30%
AM 1**
Year Units AIMI will apply AM1 I....A
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
3100
3115
3134
3156
3181
3209
3237
3262
3287
3310
3332
3353
3373
3391
3409
40%
49%
58%
66%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
170
174
179
183
188
188
188
188
188
188
188
188
188
188
188
155
156
157
158
159
160
162
163
164
165
167
168
169
170
170
total tenants
over 30%
AMI
3115
3134
3156
3181
3209
3237
3262
3287
3310
3332
3353
3373
3391
3409
3426
total percent
net annual cumul-ative over 30%
increase increase AMI
0.48%
0.60%
0.70%
0.80%
0.89%
0.84%
0.79%
0.75%
0.71%
0.67%
0.63%
0.59%
0.56%
0.53%
0.50%
0.48%
1.08%
1.80%
2.61%
3.53%
4.40%
5.23%
6.02%
6.77%
7.48%
8.15%
8.79%
9.40%
9.98%
10.53%
31.2%
31.3%
31.6%
31.8%
32.1%
32.4%
32.6%
32.9%
33.1%
33.3%
33.5%
33.7%
33.9%
34.1%
34.3%
cumulative change
in percent over
30% AMI
0.15%
0.34%
0.56%
0.81%
1.09%
1.37%
1.62%
1.87%
2.10%
2.32%
2.53%
2.73%
2.91%
3.09%
3.26%
* Percent of tenants over 30% of AMI moving out is assumed proportional to the current tenant profile (number of tenants above 30% AMI * turnover)
** Net new tenants over 30% AMI is roughly equivalent to the number of units lost for families below 30% AM I
initial
implementation
40%
long term
implemen-
tation
75%
end of year
Pace of Change: Low Ability, Low Implementation Scenario
Projected Increase in Households with Incomes Above 30% in the Project-Based Section 8 Program
Assumptions:
starting
total number percent above
old targeting new targeting
percent of
new tenants
of units 30% AMI annual turnover over 30%
10000 31% 30%
changed percent initial
new over 30% implementation
40% 25%
turnover
percent of units
to which rules
new tenants tenants over
over 30% 30% AMI
MIAi t*
net new tenants
over 30%
AMI**
Year Units AIvis will apply A.... v m uI
25%
31%
38%
44%
50%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
163
166
169
172
175
188
188
188
188
188
188
188
188
188
188
155
155
156
157
157
158
160
161
162
164
165
166
167
168
169
total tenants
over 30%
AMI
3108
3118
3131
3146
3164
3193
3221
3247
3272
3296
3319
3341
3361
3380
3399
net annual cumul-ative
increase increase
0.24%
0.33%
0.41%
0.49%
0.56%
0.93%
0.87%
0.82%
0.77%
0.73%
0.69%
0.65%
0.61%
0.58%
0.55%
0.24%
0.57%
0.99%
1.48%
2.05%
3.00%
3.90%
4.75%
5.56%
6.33%
7.06%
7.76%
8.42%
9.05%
9.64%
total percent
over 30%
AMI
31.1%
31.2%
31.3%
31.5%
31.6%
31.9%
32.2%
32.5%
32.7%
33.0%
33.2%
33.4%
33.6%
33.8%
34.0%
cumulative change
in percent over
30% AMI
0.08%
0.18%
0.31%
0.46%
0.64%
0.93%
1.21%
1.47%
1.72%
1.96%
2.19%
2.41%
2.61%
2.80%
2.99%
* Percent of tenants over 30% of AMI moving out is assumed proportional to the current tenant profile (number of tenants above 30%
** Net new tenants over 30% AMI is roughly equivalent to the number of units lost for families below 30% AMI
long term
implemen-
tation
50%
Total
Number of
Tenants
above 30%
end of year
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
3100
3108
3118
3131
3146
3164
3193
3221
3247
3272
3296
3319
3341
3361
3380
AMI * turnover)
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